While the essays “Truth and Politics” (1966) by Hannah Arendt and “Repressive Tolerance” (1965) by Herbert Marcuse were written around the same time and both address the concept of impartiality, they have distinct perspectives on it. Arendt argues that impartiality is fundamental to objective political discourse, whereas Marcuse critiques it for potentially reinforcing dominant power structures and contributing to repression rather than objective political discourse. This introductory essay seeks to compare the notion of impartiality in Arendt and Marcuse’s writing, and to explore two questions: What role does impartiality play in political life, and what is the relationship between impartiality and truth?

 

To Arendt, impartiality involves the equal treatment of all opinions, a practice that rests on liberation from personal biases and preconceived notions—in her words, “freedom from self-interest in thought and judgment” (Arendt 262). Her notion of impartiality is based on the observation that “political thought is representative,” that is, impartiality requires one to represent the viewpoints of others along with one’s own (Arendt 241). 

 

Arendt believes that impartiality should play a vital role in the political realm because it makes decision-making more objective by allowing one to treat all opinions as having equal merits or limitations. Drawing on Immanuel Kant’s differentiation between the private and public use of reason, Arendt characterizes opinions as opposed to truth, and the multitude as opposed to the individual. These two sets of oppositions set the stage for her argument that impartiality is fundamental in the political realm. Drawing from the first set of oppositions, the argument for impartiality is made on the grounds that the political realm concerns opinions rather than truth—the tension between truth and politics is suggested throughout the essay—as Arendt argues that impartiality is an approach to treating and forming opinions, not truth. Drawing from the second set of oppositions, the argument for impartiality is made on the grounds that politics is by definition a public matter—it matters to all, and all should matter to it— and impartiality, which inherently is not private, involves a broad spectrum of opinions from all segments of the public. Apart from ensuring a diversity of opinions, impartiality entails using power for the common good rather than the interests of a particular individual or group. Therefore, in an ideal world, everyone is able to represent everyone else while forming an opinion. Arendt makes clear the role impartiality should play by stating that “the very quality of an opinion, as of a judgment, depends upon the degree of its impartiality” (Arendt 242). To Arendt, judgments could certainly differ in quality. Even though they cannot be entirely objective in nature, a more impartial perspective helps one form a more valid judgment.

 

In the context of Arendt’s argument, truth does not refer to an absolute or objective truth that is coercive and beyond debate; rather, truth arises out of the ongoing process of dialogue and debate that aims at arriving at a shared understanding of reality that can be broadly accepted. This process must be guided by impartiality, which means engaging in a “disinterested pursuit” free from personal interests (Arendt 262). Meanwhile, the idea of the factual truth is also important in understanding impartiality: Arendt’s departure from Theodor Adorno’s “Opinion Delusion Society” is marked by her acknowledgement of a factual basis that freedom of expression and practice of impartiality can rely on. While Adorno was skeptical about the possibility of achieving a consensus on the most basic factual reality in contemporary society, Arendt argues that such a consensus is possible. She maintains that even though facts and events are constantly subject to interpretation, there is a factual basis which fabrications “can never compete [with] in stability,” simply because “it happens to be thus and not otherwise” (Arendt 258).

 

In comparison to Arendt, Marcuse has a different take on the concept of impartiality. In “Repressive Tolerance,” impartiality refers to the equal tolerance of all opinions in modern societies, particularly in liberal democracies. Since Arendt and Marcuse share the idea of impartiality as an absence of preconceived notions, but differ in Marcuse’s added concept of tolerance, meaningful comparisons and contrasts can be drawn.

 

According to Marcuse, impartiality does not result in equality, let alone facilitate social changes; instead, it can serve to reinforce present inequalities. Certainly, this argument rests on the assumption that society has asymmetrical power structures, an assumption that Arendt would likely agree with. Marcuse points out that the rationale of universal tolerance consists of autonomy, consciousness, and individuality. In reality, this rationale fails because “indoctrinated individuals parrot, as their own, the opinion of their masters” (Marcuse 90). Universal tolerance becomes problematic, as indoctrination results in individuals accepting ideas without engaging in critical thinking or independent evaluation. Utmost impartiality, he argues, actually serves as an instrument of repression in what he called “a democracy with totalitarian organizations,” where the line between right and wrong is blurred (Marcuse 97).  This kind of impartiality can be deceptive, and the resulting objectivity false. For example, Marcuse discusses the “neutralization of opposites” on a newspaper page that attempts to present both positive and negative aspects of reality by juxtaposing “gorgeous ads with unmitigated horrors” (Marcuse 97). While such media may appear to fulfill the requirements of objectivity, they often promote viewpoints that align with the status quo, while peripheral voices are further suppressed. What people want to see and are used to seeing tends to have a significant influence on their attitudes and behaviors. To be sure, impartiality in politics is not inherently unacceptable to Marcuse, but he would likely have argued that its extent should correspond to the degree of power imbalance—in other words, the more significant the power imbalance, the more necessary it becomes to depart from impartiality.

 

Although Marcuse does not explicitly discuss how impartiality is related to truth, it could be argued that he sees real objectivity as always related to truth, which can sometimes be clouded by universal tolerance in the name of impartiality. He contends that truth cannot be arrived at by merely engaging in a public exchange of opinions.

 

Arendt and Marcuse are both concerned with transcendence from one’s preconceived ideas, which is essential in pursuing truth in politics. However, their views diverge on how to achieve this transcendence: Arendt believes that an impartial stance enables such transcendence, whereas Marcuse recognizes the stubbornness of societal preconceptions, as individuals are never tabulae rasae, or blank slates (Marcuse 98). In terms of achieving this transcendence, Arendt calls for an open and impartial political discussion, whereas Marcuse rejects passive forms of tolerance and advocates for “the practice of discriminating tolerance,” which involves “intolerance toward prevailing policies, attitudes, and opinions, and the extension of tolerance to [those] which are outlawed or suppressed” (Marcuse 123 and 81). This radical approach urges individuals to challenge oppressive systems while embracing alternative viewpoints. Nonetheless, Arendt and Marcuse’s philosophies are multifaceted and cannot be reduced to a simple dichotomy. Arendt’s advocacy for an open and impartial political discussion does not mean she rejects the importance of judgment, as she also highlights the need for critical thinking and the ability to distinguish between truth and falsehood. Similarly, Marcuse’s critique inherently acknowledges the value of tolerance and the need to extend it to marginalized and oppressed groups.