In today’s political environment, a voter’s party membership is almost synonymous with their religion, race, and hometown. The limited two party system, coupled with the rise in social sorting, makes it such that the Democratic and Republican parties essentially reflect respective members’ identities, a phenomena known as social sorting (Mason 18). Ezra Klein,  political analyst and host of the New York Times’ “Ezra Klein Show,” coins these overlapping identities that are now enveloped by political parties as political mega identities (Klein 70). Although social sorting is not inherently problematic, it raises the stakes of political disagreements. A political loss now not only threatens policy preferences, but also a voter’s complex identity (Klein 71). With non-political identities competing in elections, losing becomes “catastrophic,” threatening democracy by making parties less likely to accept defeat (Levitsky and Ziblatt 22). The resistance of multiple Republican voters and leaders to accept the results of the 2020 election exemplifies this antidemocratic side effect of political mega-identities. Mega-identities further contribute to Congress’s dysfunction, as all votes have high stakes and the two parties cannot find common ground, debilitating the federal government’s ability to pass legislation. To strengthen U.S. democracy, the reform of electoral systems, such as through ranked choice voting for the House and Senate and changes to the Electoral College for the presidency, can mitigate the influence of political mega-identities on the elected branches. 

Electing the House of Representatives through single transferable voting encourages overlaps in voter identity across partisan lines, ultimately increasing the efficacy of the House. The House “is not meant to host the meeting of two parties but of 435 districts” (Klein 209). Political mega-identities cripple the House by consuming local identities, eliminating opportunities for cooperation amongst districts with similar demographic, geographic, or economic challenges but different party representation. The focus on mega-identities forces the House to address national issues, a function not in its original design, thus rendering the House unable to pass meaningful legislation for both localities and the nation (Howell and Moe 120). Single transferable voting in the House most obviously supports democracy by creating more choice, but it also breaks up mega-identities, enhancing democracy through the provision of shared identities. Multi-member districts create parties that, at the minimum, represent voters with a shared geographic identity. Simultaneously, ranked choice voting incentivizes candidates to appeal to a broader range of voters, as they want to be voters’ secondary choices (Parks NPR). Both elements of single transferable voting promote parties composed of voters with overlapping identities. These overlaps can serve as a powerful bridge over political divides, reducing the likelihood of  partisan gridlock in Congress (Klein 71). The increased frequency of complete and partial government shutdowns illustrates the extent to which the House cannot successfully balance the competing interests of two mega-identities. Less gridlock permits the electoral winners to actually govern, strengthening democracy by giving meaning to voters’ choices (Levitsky and  Ziblatt 142). The dispersal of political mega-identities through single transferable voting thus creates a House that is less representative of national politics and better able to meet the needs of Americans. 

Furthermore, implementing ranked choice voting in Senate elections shifts the focus of elections from symbolic to operational party ideology, making senators responsible for crafting effective policy rather than protecting identities. A key component of many rural residents’ identities is their allegiance to the Republican Party (Hochschild 154). The Senate’s “small-state” bias, which gives all states two senators regardless of their population, grants disproportionate power to the interests of these rural mega-identities, which typically represent white, Christian, and working-class males (Levitsky and Ziblatt 171; Howell and Moe 76). The rural mega-identity can thus derail the Senate through a filibuster while only representing 11 percent of the population (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2023, 175). Electing Senators through ranked choice voting, with the option for parties to run multiple candidates, refocuses parties on policy rather than identity. Symbolic ideology emphasizes party identity, meaning voters select the party they identify with even if they do not agree with the party’s policy proposals (Mason 22-23). However, voters given more choice within their party must focus on the operational differences between candidates, creating variance within the current mega-identity groups. With this reform, senators no longer represent “multiple identities all playing for the same team;” instead, they represent policy stances, lowering the stakes of losing (Mason 19). Altering the responsiveness of senators from identity to policy additionally makes the filibuster less alluring. Senators voted in on policy must achieve their policy objectives to earn re-election, meaning both parties must find strategies to compromise and actually pass bills. In this way, ranked choice voting for Senate elections addresses both of the antidemocratic effects of political mega-identities by lowering the stakes of losing and disincentivizing congressional gridlock. 

On a national scale, allocating states’ Electoral College votes in proportion to their popular vote incentivizes candidates to broaden their electorate, lowering the stakes of presidential elections. The aggregation of Electoral College votes, coupled with its winner-takes-all system, permits a candidate who receives a minority of popular votes to win (Levitsky and Ziblatt 173). This framework, in a polarized political environment, encourages candidates to appeal to their bases instead of undecided voters (Klein 173). This campaign strategy amplifies the influence of mega-identities on the presidency, as the base represents the most sorted and extreme party members (Klein 178-179). This connection between the presidency and the party’s ultra-sorted base makes the stakes of presidential elections dangerously high, as the January 6 insurrectionists demonstrated. States allocating their Electoral College votes in proportion to each candidate’s share of the popular vote maintains the framework of the Electoral College while requiring candidates to appeal to a wider range of voters. Although this system does not eliminate voters simply voting along party lines, it incentivizes candidates to appeal to as many voters as possible since they are no longer guaranteed all of a state’s electoral votes with a simple majority. Candidates who appeal to more voters break down mega-identities by building “diverse coalitions” and thus remove the extremist mentality generated by political mega-identities (Levitsky and Ziblatt 236). A candidate with connections to a wide range of identities weakens the party’s sense of a specific “in-group identity,” making the candidate less threatening to more voters (Mason 49-50). Candidates may still threaten the identities of some voters; however, the percentage of these voters decreases as candidates appeal to more voters, guarding against the rejection of election results. Importantly, this reform works in conjunction with electoral reforms to the House and Senate. A more effective Congress limits the need for a strong president, further lowering the stakes of the presidency. 

While these solutions may appear minimal in comparison to constitutional reform or amendment, they are politically achievable and hold long-term effects. Critically, all three reforms fall within the existing constitutional framework. Americans “[do not] just admire their Constitution, they worship it,” making any constitutional amendment or reform difficult (Howell and Moe 146). Substantive change, then, likely needs to be accomplished without constitutional reform. The power to make these electoral changes already resides in the Constitution; Article I, Section 4, Clause I, the States and Elections Clause, gives state legislatures the power to determine how they elect representatives and senators. Article II,  Section 1, Clause II directs states to appoint electors. In this way, reforms to national elections require state-level movements. Although states may not all adopt these changes simultaneously, this reform process strengthens democracy in and of itself as citizens become involved in their local and state legislatures. Upon implementation, these reforms will immediately alter how candidates campaign, with a subsequent effect on how much power mega-identities have over the electoral results. Encouraging different behavior from politicians has a more immediate effect than altering voter behavior through social programs, which, due to widespread inequality, is difficult to both implement and enforce. Action at the state level also does not eliminate the possibility of constitutional reform to adopt changes made across several states  (Levitsky and Ziblatt 249). Thus, reforming electoral systems to minimize the role of political mega-identities represents an available and meaningful path toward a stronger democracy. 

Political mega-identities weaken U.S. democracy through their creation of ultra-high stakes, disincentivizing cooperation and incentivizing antidemocratic behavior. The elected branches, as a result, cannot adequately address the needs of Americans, making democracy itself less appealing. The U.S. has already experienced a significant decrease in support for democracy with the election of President Trump, a populist “strongman” who openly challenges basic democratic principles, including the rule of law and the legitimacy of elections (Howell and Moe 112). To prevent further democratic backsliding, the elected branches must learn how to implement policy rather than simply represent identities. Yet, Americans cannot expect elected leaders to govern effectively when the electoral systems by which they gain power give mega-identities an outsized influence. Elections are at the heart of democracy and they need to elect leaders who act in the interest of the people, not parties. Reforming elections such that they deconstruct political mega-identities promotes a policy-driven, effective and, ultimately, stronger democracy.